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Zachary K. Ostro*

Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders: Further Limiting Limited Liability, and
Missing an Opportunity to Curb Corporate
Misconduct

In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,1 the Supreme Court
of the United States examined if the investment adviser of a mutual fund could be
held directly liable for “mak[ing]” a knowingly false statement in the mutual fund’s
prospectus under the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b–5(b) and
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 Improperly relying on its prior
holdings in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
where it expressly denied Rule 10b–5 primary liability to aiders and abettors,3 and
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., where it held that the
misstatements of a company’s supplier must be directly relied upon by the
company’s shareholders in order to be primarily liable,4 the Court held that an
investment adviser firm of a mutual fund could not be liable under Rule 10b–5
because it did not have “ultimate authority over the [false] statement.”5 In so
holding, the Court improperly treated the independence of separate corporate
entities as axiomatic, and misinterpreted (and vastly expanded) the protections
from liability in Central Bank and Stoneridge — creating the opportunity for a
loophole in corporate liability.6 Instead of opening the floodgates to litigation as the
© 2013 Zachary K. Ostro
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1. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
2. Id. at 2299.
3. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold
that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b).”).
4. 552 U.S. 148, 153 (2008).
5. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
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majority suggested, a finding of liability would have ushered in a much-needed era
of socially responsible corporate governance in the wake of the 2007–2008 financial
crisis.7 Furthermore, this holding is not unique for the modern Court; it is a
microcosm of a fervent pro-corporate jurisprudence that the Roberts Court
continues to develop.8 When viewed individually and collectively, Janus and its
sister cases pose a real and immediate threat to investors, consumers, and
employees, by shielding business entities from liability and drastically increasing
their influence (to the detriment of average citizens) in our economic and political
processes.9 In each case, the Court has failed to properly balance corporate liability
protections with citizens’ ability to receive just compensation following
misconduct.10

I. The Case
Janus Investment Fund (“the Fund”) is a business trust that holds a family of
mutual funds.11 Investors in the mutual funds own all of the Fund’s assets.12
Although its own legal entity, at the time of the initial complaint, all of the officers
of the Fund were also officers of the Fund’s investment adviser, Janus Capital
Management (JCM) — a wholly owned subsidiary of Janus Capital Group, Inc.
(JCG), a publicly traded company.13 Mutual funds are usually intended as longterm investments, and, as such, speculative and volatile forms of trading such as
market timing are generally considered to be unattractive to mutual fund
shareholders.14 To this end, many of the Fund’s prospectuses stipulated that JCM
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. See infra Part IV.D.
9. See infra Part IV.D.
10. See infra Part IV.D.
11. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d 111, 126 (4th Cir. 2009). A business trust, also referred to as a
“Massachusetts Business Trust” or “common law trust” is an unincorporated business entity held in trust for its
beneficiaries. See 13 AM. JUR. 2D Business Trusts § 1 (2011). Beneficiary rights to the corpus are transferable and
may be evidenced in a certificate of ownership. Id.
12. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d at 126.
13. Id. at 115; see also Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131
S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Every one of the Janus Funds’ 17 officers was a Vice
President of JCM.”).
14. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari). Market timing is the trading of securities that seeks to take
advantage of discrepancies in a security’s recorded Net Asset Value (NAV) and its true market value. See In re
Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 529 F.3d 207, 211 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[I]nvestors move in and out of the funds to take
advantage of the temporary differentials between the mutual funds’ daily–calculated ‘net asset value’ (‘NAV’)
and the market price of the component stocks during the course of a day.”). For example, after a market closes,
an event might occur which would alter a security’s true price yet would not be realized in its recorded NAV. Id.
Therefore, due to time zone differences causing foreign markets to be closed while U.S. markets are open, if the
security were a foreign asset, its NAV would stay constant until the close of U.S. markets. Id. Thus, an American
trader in the interim would be able to buy the security at its recorded NAV and then sell it once the foreign
market opens and the asset’s true value is reflected in its price — thereby allowing the trader to make a quick
profit by exploiting the time delay in the security’s valuation. Id. However, the shortsightedness of such trading

276

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Zachary K. Ostro
would make efforts to curb market-timing activities by its traders; these were false
statements.15 Officers of JCM and JCG, including JCG Chief Executive Officer Mark
Winston, not only allowed market timing, but also continuously tracked, and
received reports on, the activities.16 The allowance of market timing in the Fund
became public knowledge in 2003 when then New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer filed a complaint against JCG and JCM for fraudulent trading.17
As a result of Attorney General Spitzer’s allegations being made public, investors
in the Fund withdrew heavily.18 This caused a chain reaction whereby JCM’s
management fees declined, as did JCG’s total income and stock price — resulting in
First Derivative Traders (First Derivative), a class of JCG shareholders, to bring
claims against JCG and JCM.19 Their complaint alleged violations by JCG and JCM
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b–5(b) for causing
“certain misleading statements appearing in prospectuses for a number of
individual Janus funds” which stated that market timing would be curbed.20 In
addition to a direct liability claim, First Derivative also brought a control person
claim against JCG for JCM’s actions per § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.21
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed the
complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).22 According
to the district court, JCG could not be liable as a Rule 10b–5(b) primary actor
because it did not “make” false statements contained in the prospectuses;
dissemination, and use of the Janus website, logo, and name, were insufficient for a
finding of direct liability.23 Furthermore, the court held that JCM could not be liable
to First Derivative because, as shareholders of the parent company and not
investors in the Fund, there was no loss causation between the false statements in
the prospectuses and drop in JCG’s stock price.24 Furthermore, without the requisite
“nexus” between First Derivative’s loss and the issued prospectuses, JCG could not
be held liable as a control person.25

“can harm mutual fund investors by causing mutual funds to manage their portfolios in a manner that is
disadvantageous to long-term shareholders” because the volatility of such trading is contradictory to the
stability mutual fund investors expect. Id.
15. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d at 117.
16. Brief for Respondent at 4, 7, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari).
17. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Lit., 566 F.3d at 118.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 115.
20. Id. at 114–15.
21. Id. at 114.
22. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F.Supp. 2d 618, 620, 624 (D. Md. 2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
(dismissing a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
23. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 487 F. Supp. 2d. at 621–22.
24. Id. at 623.
25. Id. at 623–24.
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First Derivative appealed, arguing the district court improperly dismissed its
complaint for failure to state a claim.26 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that First Derivative made a valid claim against
JCM because the average investor would conclude, given JCM’s day-to-day control
over the Fund, that JCM issued the statement, or at least would have approved of its
issuance.27 However, the Circuit Court held that First Derivative did not have a
valid Rule 10b–5(b) claim against JCG because it was too separate from the Fund’s
day-to-day activities for an investor to infer JCG played a role in issuing the false
statement.28 As such, according to the court, JCG’s potential liability was limited to
control person liability per § 20(a) of the Act.29
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to decide if JCM
could be held primarily liable in a Rule 10b–5 claim for false statements made in the
Fund’s prospectuses.30

II. Legal Background
Historically, courts have struggled to develop a properly balanced interpretation of
Rule 10b–5.31 Determined to judicially create the necessary mechanics to ensure safe
and open markets, while unwilling to legislate from the bench, the Supreme Court
has slowly developed a more complete understanding of a Rule 10b–5 violation.32
This piecemeal, and cautious, development of what constitutes a viable securities
fraud led the Court to create a private right of action in Superintendent of Ins. of
N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,33 and then, over the past forty years, to
conservatively interpret that right.34 In so doing, the Court has read Rule 10b–5 with
cautious liberality — avoiding judicial overreach, while working to ensure
Congressional intent in enacting the Securities Exchange Act.35 However,
development of that right has been scaled back in recent years — leading to Janus
where the Court improperly limited the scope of Rule 10b–5 liabilities.36

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 114 (4th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 131.
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 130 S. Ct. 3499 (2010).
See infra Parts II.B–C.
See infra Parts II.B–C.
404 U.S. 6, 12 n.9 (1971).
See infra Parts II.B–C.
See infra Parts II.B–C.
See infra Parts II.B–C.
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A. Congress Passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the Wake of the Great
Depression as a Means of Promoting Sound Financial Markets
Following the Great Depression and the Stock Market Crash of 1929, Congress
recognized the need for a strong federal regulator to oversee securities markets.37 In
order to ensure investor confidence, while promoting open markets, fair
transacting, and honest securities traders, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).38 The overarching
intent of creating the SEC, and establishing federal regulations, was “to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to
achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”39 In order to
hold securities traders accountable for any potential wrongdoing, and violation of
the public trust, § 10(b) of the Act makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly,” to “use or employ . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe.”40
1. To Enforce § 10(b) of the Act, the SEC Promulgated Rule 10b–5
In pursuance of the Congressional delegation to the SEC in § 10(b), the SEC
implemented Rule 10b–5 — the enforcement mechanism against “manipulative
and deceptive devices” in the securities market.41 Mirroring the language of § 10(b),
Rule 10b–5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or,

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

15 U.S.C. § 78b (discussing the need for federal regulation of security trading).
15 U.S.C. § 78d.
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (emphasis in original).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5.

Vol. 8, No. 1 2013

279

Janus Capital Group
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.42
It is unclear from the exact language of Rule 10b–5 if private citizens, as investors,
have standing or if enforcement is limited to actions brought by the SEC —
requiring the Court to interpret the Congressional intent in passing § 10(b).43
2. The Court Has Read a Private Right of Action Into § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5
In Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,44 the Supreme Court
read a private right of action into the language of Rule 10b–5.45 Acknowledging the
lack of express direction from Congress, the Court asserted that the Act, and §
10(b) in particular, are not limited to the goal of maintaining stable securities
markets.46 Rather, the statute “must be read flexibly, not technically and
restrictively” in order to provide private citizens a means of “redress under §
10(b).”47
B. Over Time, the Court Established the Requirements and Limitations of Who Can
Sue Under the Implied Private Right of Action
After establishing the private right of action, the Court began to limit the scope of
the action.48 Doing this, according to the Court, was a necessary action to properly
implement and enforce Congress’s intent in first enacting the Securities Exchange
Act.49 However, in order to avoid frivolous suits, while maintaining investors’ access
to judicial remedy, the Court has established a set of requirements a private
plaintiff, or class thereof, must meet in order to bring a valid action.50

42. Id.
43. See infra Part II.A.2.
44. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
45. Id. at 13 n.9.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id.
48. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
49. See, e.g., Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (“The securities statutes seek
to maintain public confidence in the marketplace” by curbing misconduct “through the availability of private
securities fraud actions”).
50. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
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1. The Court Has Adopted the Requirement of Materiality of Misstatements and an
Investor’s Reliance in Order to Establish a Valid Claim
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,51 the Court held that in order for a plaintiff to bring a valid
securities fraud claim under § 10(b), the misstatements made must be of a material
nature, and “[i]t is not enough that a statement is false or incomplete” if it “is
otherwise insignificant.”52 To determine what is “material,” the Court adopted an
ad hoc balancing test where it looks at facts unique to each situation — such as the
likelihood a misstatement will impact investment decisions, and the overall
ramifications of those decisions.53
Additionally, the plaintiff must rely on the material misstatement.54 The Court
has “found a rebuttable presumption of reliance in two different circumstances”55
— if there is a material omission and an actor had a duty to disclose,56 or under the
“fraud-on-the-market doctrine.”57 This doctrine adopts a theory that in an efficient
market, the price of a security represents all publicly available information on the
asset.58 Therefore, when an investor purchases a security, they do so based off of its
price making it an attractive purchase; thereby necessarily creating reliance on the
false statement or omission because that misconduct altered the security’s market
price.59 Over time, the Court added further requirements in addition to materiality
and reliance in order to make a valid § 10(b) claim of securities fraud.60
2. The Court Has Established Six Elements for a Valid Rule 10b–5 Claim
While the Court in Basic established a private right of action in securities fraud
litigation to complement criminal and SEC enforcement suits,61 in order to avoid
frivolous suits, it was necessary to judicially establish a complete set of

51. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
52. Id. at 238.
53. Id. (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (“[M]aterial[ity] … will
depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur and the
anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.”)) (internal quotations
omitted).
54. Id. at 243.
55. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008).
56. Id. (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972)).
57. Id.
58. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
59. Id.
60. See infra Part II.B.2.
61. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (“This Court has long
recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential
supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions. . .”).
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requirements.62 Relying on case law, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act which requires plaintiffs in private securities actions to plead with
“particularity” certain elements of a claim,63 in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo64 the Supreme Court outlined six elements plaintiffs must meet in order to
have a valid securities fraud claim.65 Following Dura, in order for private plaintiffs
to make a valid Rule 10b–5 claim, they must illustrate: (i) “a material
misrepresentation (or omission),”66 (ii) a wrongful state of mind (“scienter”),67 (iii)
a connection between the misrepresentation and the “purchase or sale of a
security,”68 (iv) “reliance” on the misstatement,69 (v) “economic loss,”70 and (vi) the
loss must be connected to the misstatement.71 In addition to the limitations
imposed on plaintiffs with regard to how they must sue pursuant to § 10(b) and
Rule 10b–5, the Court has also imposed limitations on who plaintiffs can sue.72

62. Id. (emphasizing the importance of “meritorious” suits); see also Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 189 (1994) (discussing the negative economic consequences high
levels of securities fraud litigation).
63. Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). In a
standard private civil claim of action, a plaintiff’s complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Aschcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted); see also FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). However, in fraud actions, per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b), plaintiffs must “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” FED. R. CIV. P.
9(b). Similarly, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) requires plaintiffs to plead “with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind” in
committing the securities fraud. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2)(A).
64. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
65. Id. at 341–42.
66. Id. at 341 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988)).
67. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 199 (1976)).
68. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730–31 (1975)).
69. Id. 341–42 (2005) (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 248–49).
70. Id. at 342 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4)).
71. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(4)). It should be noted, however, that there is currently disagreement
as how to properly synthesize Dura’s elements with the requirements of the PSLRA; uncertainty remains as to
which elements, if not all, must be plead with particularity. Compare Brief for Respondent at 54–55, Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari)
(asserting that scienter was the only element of a securities fraud claim a plaintiff must plead with particularity
because the PSLRA only requires a “‘strong’ inference of scienter,” and courts are allowed to make inferences in
“determining the sufficiency of pleadings as to the other elements”) (internal citations omitted), with Brief for
Petitioner at 55, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011) (No. 09–525)
(illustrating that since “[m]ental state is rarely susceptible to direct proof” Congress only intended to allow
plaintiffs to plead with inferences to the element of scienter, but other elements “can be proved directly, and
thus must be plead ‘with particularity’—not inferred”) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
72. See infra Part II.C.
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C. To Complement Strict Pleading Requirements for Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud
Litigation, the Court Has also Limited the Scope of Potential Actions Creating a Private
Right of Action Under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5
Just as the Court was reluctant to allow a broad right under a judicially established
cause of action, the Court has also been reluctant to expose a large group of
potential defendants to primary liability for securities fraud.73 To that end, in
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,74 the Court
limited those primarily liable in a private action for “mak[ing]” a false statement
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 to those individuals or entities that actually made a
material misstatement or omission, while denying a private cause of action against
those who are secondarily liable for aiding or abetting the violator.75 Following the
Court’s holding in Central Bank, Congress, in § 1014 of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 amended § 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to limit aider and abettor (secondary) liability to enforcement actions brought
by the SEC.76
1. Non-Corporate “Insiders” per Central Bank are Not Necessarily “Outsiders” and
Thus, Under the Right Circumstances, Can be Primarily Liable in a Rule 10b–5 Action
Although Central Bank’s holding facially limits the types of actors who may be
potentially liable under Rule 10b–5 to those inside, and working for, the
corporation,77 the limitation it imposed was on the action not the actor.78 The Court
in Central Bank explicitly stated:
Any person or entity, including a[n outside] lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or
omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as
a primary violator under 10b–5, assuming all of the [other] requirements
for primary liability under Rule 10b–5 are met.79

73. See, e.g., Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011) (“[W]e are
mindful that we must give narrow dimensions . . . to a private right of action Congress did not authorize when
it first enacted the statute.”) (citing Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 167 (2008)) (internal quotations omitted).
74. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
75. Id. at 180.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
77. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 176 (asserting that Plaintiff’s improperly read the use of “indirectly” in
Rule10b–5 as extending a private right of action against corporate outsiders).
78. Id. at 191.
79. Id. (emphasis in original).
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This reasoning comports with earlier Court decisions that held that even if a
contributor to a materially false statement was not named in the statement, they
could still be held primarily liable under Rule 10b–5.80 And in interpreting Central
Bank, lower federal courts similarly have held that individuals or institutions that
do not themselves produce the misstatement can still be liable if they: produce
documents that are used to create a misstatement and are then reproduced in the
statement, prepare but do not sign the document, or use an innocent conduit to
produce or issue the statement.81 However, in order to avoid overreach of holding
corporate outsiders primarily liable under Rule 10b–5, in Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc.,82 it was necessary for the Court to elaborate
on the reliance requirement.83
2. In Stoneridge the Court Clarified the Requirement of Reliance for a Valid Rule 10b–
5 Claim
Although Central Bank limited the private right of action to primary liability, in so
doing the Court emphasized that under the right circumstances corporate outsiders
could potentially be held primarily liable under Rule 10b–5, and lower federal
courts have relied on Central Bank to extend primary liability in circumstances even
where the maker of the statement is not facially responsible.84 Without limitations,
this holding has the potential to create a broad right of action against corporate
outsiders — thereby usurping the role of the SEC in bringing enforcement actions
per § 20(a) of the Act. Therefore, in Stoneridge the Court clarified the division
between those primarily liable under § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, and those that are
only secondarily liable as an aider or abettor.85 In Stoneridge, the Court held that the
80. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Hudelston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983) (holding that corporate
officers or outside advisers may be primarily liable even if “they are not named” in the statement); see also
Anixter v. Home–Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225–27 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding outsider auditor
primarily liable when opinion and certification letters were reproduced in a prospectus); McConville v. SEC,
465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding a Chief Financial Officer was primarily liable for drafting
misstatements which were later reproduced in her company’s 10–K even though she did not sign or file the
public statement); SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding an outsider consultant could
be primarily liable for drafting statements later reviewed, certified, and published in a company’s filing
statements). The extension of primary liability to secondary actors, however, is limited in scope — every
element of the Rule 10b–5 element has to be met. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191. There are numerous
circumstances where secondary actors cannot be held liable. See Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d
1040, 1046 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that an outsider auditor could not be primarily liable for misconduct after
the completion of the sale of the security); Wright v. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying
primary liability of an auditor when the misstatements were not “attributed” to it); Ziemba v. Cascae Int’l, Inc.,
256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001) (same, actor was an outside law firm); Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP,
476 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2007) (same, actor was an auditor).
81. See supra note 80.
82. 552 U.S. 148 (2008).
83. Id. at 152.
84. See supra Part II.C.1.
85. Stoneridge, 511 U.S. at 153.
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supplier of a company who colluded with the corporation to cause it to mislead
their outside auditor — resulting in fraudulent financial statements on which
shareholders relied — could not be held primarily liable because the statements
made by the supplier were not directly relied on by the investors.86 Thus, in
Stoneridge, the Court did not expressly overrule Central Bank, but simply clarified
that a corporate outsider may be only liable if the investor directly relies on their
misstatement — thereby reiterating the distinction between primary and secondary
liability, and the need to have a limited interpretation of the implied right of
action.87
3. Despite the Piecemeal Development of the Requirements for a Proper Rule 10b–5
Cause of Action, Securities Fraud Litigation and Corporate Misconduct Have Persisted
In spite of, or perhaps due to, the gradual development of an understanding of
which actions, or actors, can be held primarily liable for securities fraud, ambiguity
in the law has persisted.88 In response to this lack of clarity, corporate actors have
continually found new ways to side step liability under Rule 10b–5.89 For these
reasons, the Court continues to be called to clarify the scope and meaning of Rule
10b–5 to best provide a remedy for securities fraud while avoiding judicial
activism.90 Similarly, financial crises have forced Congress to redefine, and expand,
securities laws to best ensure socially responsible corporate conduct — most
recently with the holistic Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act.91

86. Id.
87. Id. However, after Stoneridge, lower courts properly read the Court’s discussion of reliance to maintain
the private right of action against outsiders discussed in Central Bank. See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249,
1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding an outsider consultant could be primarily liable for drafting statements later
reviewed, certified, and published in a company’s filing statements).
88. See infra Part IV.
89. See infra Part IV.
90. See infra Part IV.
91. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF
SECONDARY ACTORS 2, 6 (2011) (discussing, per Congressional order via Dodd-Frank, the potential advantages,
and support for, amending securities fraud law to potentially hold secondary actors primarily liable); Liability
for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposed bill which
would extend a private right of action to aider and abettors); Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities
Violations Act of 2010, H.R. 5042, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (same); see also Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming
a Financial Regulatory Black Hold with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic
Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi–Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 128
(2011) (discussing how, “if properly implemented” the regulations proposed in Dodd-Frank would have the
ability to minimize risk and improve corporate governance). But see, Stephen Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack
Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 U. MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783 (2010) (stating that both SarbanesOxley and Dodd-Frank are improper regulations of corporate governance and unjustified responses to anticorporate populism).
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III. The Court’s Reasoning
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,92 the Supreme Court, in a
five-to-four decision,93 held that JCM did not “make” the false statements in the
Fund’s prospectuses, and therefore, could not be primarily liable for a fraud-onthe-market claim under Rule 10b–5(b).94 Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
held that in order to “make” a statement per Rule 10b–5(b) the entity must have
“ultimate authority over the statement.”95 Here, Justice Thomas declared, because
the Fund issued the prospectuses, the Fund had final control over the
misstatements — causing the Fund, and not JCM, to be the only entity that had
“authority over” it.96 Drawing a parallel to the relationship between a speechwriter
and a speaker, Justice Thomas asserted that while an individual or entity might have
a hand in shaping and drafting the message, the statements are only attributable to
the speaker.97
To support this analogy, Justice Thomas took a textual reading of Rule 10b–5(b)
— declaring that while “make” itself can act as a verb when the action is directed at
a noun “(e.g.: to make a chair),” in other contexts when “make” is paired with a
noun which conveys its own action, “the resulting phrase is approximately
equivalent in sense to that verb.”98 Thus, to “make a[] . . . statement” becomes
equivalent to “to state.”99 Accordingly, Justice Thomas held that the language of
Rule 10b–5(b) only extends liability to the person or entity that itself “states” the
falsity, and, therefore, the Government’s assertion that “mak[ing]” should be
equivalent to “creat[ing]” was too broad.100 Correspondingly, Justice Thomas also
rejected First Derivative’s argument that the word “indirectly” in Rule 10b–5
should modify “make” as it does not directly modify “make,” but rather all of the
verbs in Rule 10b–5, including the actions in sub-sections 10b–5(a) and 10b–5(c)
“to employ” and “to engage;” suggesting that “indirectly” refers to how the
statement is conveyed to the public, not one’s role in issuing the statement.101
This close reading, according to Justice Thomas, is in line with the Congressional
intent in originally drafting the Securities Exchange Act, and its unwillingness to
legislatively expand liability under Rule 10b–5, and the Court’s prior holding in

92. 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
93. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion of the Court; Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Alito joined; Justice Breyer wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Id. at
2299.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2302.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2302–03 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
99. Id. at 2302 (internal quotations omitted).
100. Id. at 2303–04 (internal citations omitted).
101. Id. at 2305 n.11 (internal quotations omitted).
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Central Bank102 where it denied a private right of action to aiders and abettors.103 By
limiting the actors potentially primarily liable in a private Rule 10b–5 action, Justice
Thomas drew “a clean line” between those that can be held directly liable, and those
who only aid and abet.104 Any broader reading, per Justice Thomas, would
“undermine” this distinction in Central Bank and open the courts to private actions
against any party who contributes to the making of a false statement — thereby
creating a new right of action expressly denied by Congress when it limited control
person liability to an action brought by the SEC.105 This reasoning, according to
Justice Thomas, is consistent with the Court’s holding in Stoneridge because like the
supplier in Stoneridge, JCM’s actions were not themselves public, but rather only
contributed to public statements and were thus not directly relied upon by First
Derivative.106
In so holding, Justice Thomas rejected First Derivative’s claim that the
overlapping relationship between an investment adviser and a mutual fund is
unique and should cause JCM’s actions to extend beyond mere aiding and abetting
— allowing JCM to be considered the direct actor — and “decline[d] this invitation
to disregard the corporate form.”107 Justice Thomas illustrated that because the
Fund was a legally separate entity from JCM, First Derivative’s reading would
expand the scope of Rule 10b–5 liability that the Court expressly rejected in
Stoneridge.108 Furthermore, Justice Thomas stated that “[a]ny reapportionment of
liability in the securities industry,” given its unique nature, is a matter of legislation
and reserved to Congress expressly.109
Finding the majority’s interpretation of “make” to be too narrow, and an
extension of the protection of liability granted in Central Bank, Justice Breyer,
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, dissented.110 According to
Justice Breyer, the majority misinterpreted Central Bank’s protection of liability as
excluding Rule 10b–5 liability for any separate legal entity by requiring
“attribution” to a false statement made in a public document.111 This ruling, Justice
Breyer asserted, improperly applied Central Bank, which was concerned with
secondary liability, to a question of primary liability, and extended its protections;
102. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
103. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302 (2011); Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
104. Janus Capital Group 131 S. Ct. at 2302 n.6.
105. Id. at 2302.
106. Id. at 2303.
107. Id. at 2304.
108. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (detailing the requirements of independence of a corporation’s board
members)). Furthermore, Justice Thomas also noted that First Derivative failed to illustrate that any comments
made by JCM to the Fund were “public statements” as required for a securities fraud violation. Id. at 2304 & n.9
(citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227–28 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2305–06 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 2308 (internal citation omitted).
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instead of “drawing a clean line,” the majority, in Justice Breyer’s view, expressly
broadened liability protection to a situation the Court in Central Bank suggested
would give rise to a private cause of action under Rule 10b–5.112 Here, Justice Breyer
declared, JCM was directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the Fund and
the relationship between the two entities “could hardly have been closer.”113 Thus,
unless the Court incorrectly and “arbitrarily exclude[s] from the scope of the word
‘make’ those who manage a firm,” per Justice Breyer’s opinion, management
persons and entities should be held liable for misstatements issued themselves, or
through an “unknowing intermediary” that they manage.114

IV. Analysis
The Court’s holding in Janus failed on three distinct levels, as it: misinterpreted
existing case law, missed an opportunity to add nuance to the law, and ignored the
implications of its holding which created a loophole for corporate actors to avoid
(or attempt to avoid) securities fraud liability.115 In so doing, the Court expanded
the limitations of Central Bank’s holding, failed to add nuance to the law to address
the unique nature of mutual funds, while denying shareholders of JCG remedy and
indirectly encouraged corporate misconduct at a time when increased corporate
responsibility and responsiveness is crucial.116 In Janus the Court simultaneously
failed to adhere to judicial restraint and acknowledge recent Congressional
(in)action.117 Coming in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the Court’s
holding in Janus improperly ignored the ramifications of its holding, and missed an
opportunity to judicially create a catalyst for much needed corporate reform.118
Furthermore, this holding highlights the modern Court’s unnecessarily procorporate jurisprudence; in a series of cases, the Court has continuously preserved
corporate immunity from liability, and denied individuals any legal remedy for
corporate misconduct.119

112. Id.
113. Id. at 2312
114. Id. Justice Breyer also found fault with the majority’s interpretation of Stoneridge — asserting that
Stoneridge was a case concerning if investors relied on statements made, not which entity made a statement. Id.
at 2308–09. Therefore, Justice Breyer found the majority’s reliance on Stoneridge to be misplaced, and
inapposite to the facts of this case. Id. at 2309–10. Lastly, Justice Breyer also criticized the majority for its
unwillingness to remand the case to allow First Derivative to amend their complaint to, as the majority suggests
is a possibility, claim JCG and JCM could be liable in a § 20(a) aiding and abetting suit brought by the SEC. Id.
at 2311 (internal cross reference omitted).
115. See infra Parts IV.A–C.
116. See infra Parts IV.A–C.
117. See infra Part IV.C.
118. See infra Part IV.C.
119. See infra Part IV.D.
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A. The Court’s Holding Improperly Misapplied Case Law by Expanding the
Limitations Central Bank Imposed
In holding that JCM did not “make” the false statements in the Fund’s prospectus,
the Court misinterpreted both Congress’s original intent in enacting the Securities
Exchange Act, and the limitations Central Bank imposed.120 Vigilantly afraid of
judicial overreach, Justice Thomas, in refusing to expand those potentially liable
under Rule 10b–5, inadvertently expanded the Rule’s limitations and incorrectly
applied Stoneridge to an inapplicable set of circumstances.121 On the surface, the
Court merely reiterated prior case law when it held that “the maker of a statement
is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it.”122 However, this holding shifted
the focus from action to the actor — thereby expanding the scope of actors
protected from Rule 10b–5 liability.123
1. Justice Thomas’s Textual Interpretation of Rule 10b–5 Contradicts the Legislative
History of § 10(b) and the Context of Rule 10b–5 Promulgation which Requires a
Flexible Reading
The economic realities that gave rise to the enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act, and promulgation of Rule 10b–5, closely mirror the current financial climate.
As such, it would have been pertinent for the Court to take the recent financial
collapse into consideration. The Act was created with the express purpose of
ensuring fair and open securities markets.124 In order to maintain investor
confidence, while encouraging investment activity, it was Congress’s express
intention to avoid corporate misconduct and maintain a high standard of clear,
recognizable, and responsive business principles.125 Therefore, in order to give the
legislative intent full support to best apply the spirit of the law, the Court has
continuously read § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 “not technically and restrictively” but
“flexibly” to best apply its purpose.126 Indeed, implying the right of action is a

120. See infra Part IV.A.1.
121. See infra Part IV.A.2.
122. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
123. See infra Part IV.A.2.
124. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (stating that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should
be read liberally to best enforce the statute’s purpose).
125. See Brief for Respondent at 14, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Congress’s primary purposes in enacting the Exchange Act was to
establish ‘honest securities markets and thereby promote investor confidence after the market crash of 1929’
and ‘to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high
standard of business ethics in the securities industry.’”) (citing Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819) (emphasis in original)
(internal citations omitted).
126. Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
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perfect example of the Court’s liberal reading.127 The Court’s prior unwillingness to
expand on that right was a necessary balance in order to avoid meritless lawsuits,
however, the limitations imposed in Janus unjustly established an imbalance in
securities fraud litigation by limiting the number of potentially liable primary
violators.128
By taking such a textual reading of Rule 10b–5, without consideration of the
Rule’s purpose and legislative intent, or the Court’s instruction in SEC v. Zandford
requiring a liberal reading (a unanimous opinion in which he participated), Justice
Thomas improperly held that JCM could not be primarily liable for false statements
made in the prospectus.129 In his strict interpretation of “make,” and closed reading
of Central Bank and Stoneridge, Justice Thomas’s analysis was limited in scope.130 In
holding that JCM did not “make” the false statements because it did not have
“ultimate authority” over the statements, Justice Thomas focused solely on the fact
that “corporate formalities were observed,”131 such as the fact that the Fund was the
only entity to have the statutory duty to file the prospectuses with the SEC, in order
to maintain JCM and the Fund as separate legal entities.132 Focusing on these
technical formalities, without an analysis of the substance of the creation and
dissemination of the misstatements, Justice Thomas improperly expanded the
Court’s holding in Central Bank, and misapplied Stoneridge.133
2. Justice Thomas’s Limited Interpretation of “[M]ake” and Inflexible Adherence to
Corporate Technicalities Vastly Expanded Rule 10b–5 Liability Protections
In the Court’s holding, Justice Thomas, in an attempt to adhere to Central Bank’s
protection of aiders and abettors, inappropriately expanded that protection to
primary violators.134 As previously mentioned, the Court in Central Bank expressly
asserted that a corporate outsider could be held primarily liable provided all of the

127. See supra Part II.A.2.
128. See infra Part IV.A.2.
129. See infra Part IV.A.2.
130. See infra Part IV.A.2.
131. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302, 2304 (2011) (internal
quotations omitted). Justice Thomas relied on a select set of cases, and his analysis was primarily limited to a
textual reading of Rule 10b–5. Id. at 2302. In so doing, Justice Thomas failed to consider the numerous cases,
both before and after Central Bank and Stoneridge, where separate legal entities from the entity issuing the
misstatement, or undisclosed individuals, could still be held liable. See supra note 80.
132. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304.
133. See id. at 2308 (“[D]epending upon the circumstances [under Central Bank], board members, senior
firm officials, officials tasked to develop a marketing document, large investors, or others (taken together or
separately) all might ‘make’ materially false statements subjecting themselves to primarily liability. The
majority’s rule does not protect, it extends, Central Bank’s holding of no-liability into new territory that Central
Bank explicitly placed outside that holding. And by ignoring the language in which Central Bank did so, the
majority’s rule itself undermines Central Bank.”) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
134. Id.
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six elements of a valid Rule 10b–5 claim are met.135 First Derivative made a valid
claim: JCM (having total control over the Fund) caused prospectuses to be issued,
which included the material misstatement that the Fund did not engage in market
timing; JCM knowingly caused the misstatements to be issued; the misstatements
made the mutual funds more marketable because of the risks market timing creates,
which in turn made JCG a more attractive investment for members of First
Derivative; First Derivative members relied on the misstatement in purchasing
stock in JCG; shareholders of JCG lost money following the disclosure that JCM
136
allowed market timing; and the loss was a result of the misstatements. No one,
not even Justice Thomas, would conclude otherwise; in fact, Justice Thomas
recognized the high level of control JCM had over the Fund by admitting in a
footnote that it could, even under his narrow reading of § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, be
held liable for “act[ing] through [an] innocent intermediar[y].”137 The holding of
no liability per Rule 10b–5 is solely due to his limited interpretation of “make” and
focus on corporate structure technicalities.138 However, as illustrated, this reading is
in direct conflict with Central Bank.139
JCM had total control of the production and distribution of the prospectuses,
and directly caused the economic loss suffered by the plaintiffs.140 A mutual fund as
an independent corporate entity is a legal fiction; they are a shell with all of their
directors and officers wearing dual hats — serving the Fund while also serving
either the parent company or the investment adviser.141 Thus, to limit the
potentially liable actor to the entity with “ultimate control” in a mutual fund
scenario denies investors the opportunity to sue anyone.142 Additionally, by
asserting nothing on the prospectuses indicated that JCM in fact “ma[d]e” the
misstatements, Justice Thomas failed to consider the fact that the “Janus” name is
the property of JCG (and thus JCM as its wholly-owned subsidiary), and the Funds
have been allowed to use the name in conducting business.143 This allowed Justice
Thomas to declare, by citing Stoneridge, that the investors did not rely on JCM’s
135. See supra Part II.B.2.
136. See supra Part. I; see also Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting); In re Mutual Funds Inv.
Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding First Derivative’s § 10(b) claim against JCM was sufficient to
overcome the motion to dismiss).
137. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2304 n.10 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2304 (majority opinion) (internal quotations omitted).
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assocs. LP, 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that “mutual funds are ‘captives’ of investment advisers”); see also supra
Part I.
142. See infra Part IV.C.1.
143. See Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Janus entities engaged in a coordinated marketing strategy that
blurred the distinction between the entities that constituted JCG’s business, so that investors perceived a unified
Janus brand.”).
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misstatements.144 However, provided the fact that JCM cannot be separated from
the Fund, JCM had ultimate control over the day-to-day operations of the Fund,
and the prospectuses were issued under the Janus name, the Fourth Circuit
properly held that the investors did rely on the misstatements to purchase stock in
JCG.145
Based off of this holding, by construing such a limited reading of “make” in an
attempt to stay true to the Court’s purpose in Central Bank to avoid excessive
litigation, Justice Thomas improperly expanded its protections.146 The Court was
right in Central Bank when it denied a private right of action for aiding and
abetting.147 Accountants, lawyers, consultants, bankers, and financiers play a crucial
role in our economic structure, and to hold such actors primarily liable in any
securities fraud action — even if they themselves are not the primary violator —
would both open the floodgates to litigation, and discourage smart and capable
people from entering those professions.148 When outsiders play a direct role in the
issuance of a misstatement or omission, the Court recognized in Central Bank the
need to hold them primarily liable.149 However, Justice Thomas’s unwillingness to
read “make” liberally unnecessarily expanded Central Bank’s protections to
corporate outsiders even when they are primarily liable.150 Even if the Court’s
interpretation and expansion of Central Bank is proper, an exception should be
recognized in the mutual fund scenario.151
B. Even Under the Court’s Rule of Who “[M]ake[s]” a Misstatement per Rule 10b–5,
an Exception Should be Made for the Mutual Fund-Investment Adviser Relationship
Provided the Interdependence Between the Two Entities
The Court’s holding, by limiting the type of actors potentially liable under Rule
10b–5, even if it were accepted as prudent in an average securities fraud situation,
would still be improper when the misstatements are made by a mutual fund’s

144. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011).
145. In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2009).
146. See supra note 130.
147. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
148. See id. at 189 (“[U]ncertainty and excessive litigation can have ripple effects. For example, newer and
smaller companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals . . . In addition, the increased costs
incurred by professionals because of the litigation and settlement costs under 10b–5 may be passed on to their
client companies, and in turn incurred by the company’s investors, the intended beneficiaries of the statute.”)
(citing Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of
Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 948–66 (1993)).
149. Id. at 191.
150. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2308 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
151. See Brief for Respondent at 21, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (discussing the close relationship between a mutual fund and its
investment adviser should have guided the Court’s opinion).
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investment adviser, because doing so effectively eliminates a private right of action
in this scenario.152 As previously illustrated, JCG, JCM, and the Fund purposely held
themselves out as one entity to the investing public.153 Additionally, all of the Fund’s
directors and operators were from, and thus its day-to-day operations were
controlled by, JCM; all seventeen of the Fund’s officers were Vice Presidents of
JCM, the Fund’s General Counsel simultaneously served the same position for JCG
and JCM, the Fund’s Chairman was the former CEO of JCG, and the primary
revenue stream for JCG was JCM’s management of the Funds.154 This situation is
not unique in the mutual fund market.155 Accordingly, even by accepting the
Court’s interpretation of “make,” it should have created an exception for the
mutual fund—investment adviser relationship.156 By not creating such an exception,
in the average mutual fund securities fraud claim, the plaintiffs are denied the
ability to seek judicial remedy against anyone; most mutual funds do not have
directors, officers, or employees distinct from the investment adviser, yet remain a
separate legal entity.157 Therefore, by focusing on the legal separateness of
individuals and entities who issue statements, and not the substantive actions, in
Janus the Court imprudently denied a private right of action in almost all mutual
fund-related securities fraud claims, and gave corporations and corporate actors a
roadmap as to how to avoid liability.158 In so doing, the Court not only missed an
opportunity to curb corporate misconduct, but also expressly created a loophole in
the law that will encourage it.159
C. Janus Will Encourage Corporate Misconduct
In holding that JCM could not be primarily liable for false statements made in the
Fund’s prospectuses, not only did the Court deny the class members of First
Derivative an opportunity to financially recover from their losses, but it also
improperly provided corporations with a roadmap as to how to avoid liability.160
For these reasons, the Court’s holding in Janus was a failure on both the micro and
the macro level. The bright-line rule of what it means to “make” a statement for
152. Id.
153. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
154. Brief for Respondent at 4, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011)
(No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari).
155. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
156. See Brief for Respondent at 21, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (discussing how the close relationship between a mutual fund and
its investment adviser should allow the Court to have found JCM liable under Rule 10b–5(b)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 30.
159. See infra Part IV.C.
160. See Brief for Respondent at 30, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (stating a finding that JCM could not be liable for “mak[ing]” a false
statement “opens a roadmap for securities-fraud violators”).
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purposes of Rule 10b–5 was improper, and will have, absent Congressional action
to amend the Securities Exchange Act, strong negative reverberations in the
corporate world.161
1. Justice Thomas’s Reasoning, by Emphasizing the Corporate Form, Created a
Loophole in Federal Securities Law
By emphasizing that: (i) JCM was a separate legal entity; (ii) it followed corporate
formalities; and (iii) the Fund, not JCM, distributed the prospectuses, Justice
Thomas injudiciously focused on the form of transactions, and not the substance.162
In so doing, the Court provided corporations with a step-by-step plan as to how to
avoid liability: create a legally separate corporation, trust, or other business entity;
funnel all misstatements or omissions though it; and therefore avoid liability.163
Regardless of the fact that the separate entity would be a shell — having no
independent directors, officers, or employees of its own — it, per the holding in
Janus, would be the only entity potentially liable for securities fraud.164 Based on his
holding, it would appear, that if Justice Thomas were to watch The Wizard of Oz, he
would in fact “pay no attention to that man behind the curtain” and attribute all of
the statements completely to the fictional image with absolute disregard to the
person giving it life and controlling its every move.165 By focusing on corporate form
and ignoring the substance of the transactions, Justice Thomas improperly held that
the only entity that could be liable in this case, and in likely future cases, is a shell
firm with no actual independent agents or other actors, and not the individuals who
are actually doing all of the work.166
This limited reading of Rule 10b–5 not only denies investors the ability to seek
judicial remedy in a private right of action, but it also makes it more difficult for the
SEC to bring enforcement actions against aiders and abettors pursuant to § 20(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act.167 In order for one to aid or abet, there must be an

161. Id.
162. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).
163. See id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule 10b–5, its language, its
history, or in precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, intended a loophole of the
kind that the majority’s rule may well create.”); see also Scott Lemieux, The Right to Double Speak, AMERICAN
PROSPECT (July 14, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/right-double-speak (“The Court's opinion provides a
blueprint for executives of financial firms who want to profit from defrauding their customers: Just form a
subsidiary your company runs, and you can't be held responsible for lying to the customers who choose to do
business with you.”).
164. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
165. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
166. See supra notes 162, 165 and accompanying text.
167. See Brief for Respondent at 30, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari) (“Nor is it clear that the SEC could bring an enforcement action on
an aiding-and-abetting theory against an entity that creates and disseminates misstatements issued in another
entity’s name.”).
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actor, or actors, who the aider aids.168 If a shell corporation issues a statement, but
itself has no independent agents, there can be no identifiable primary violator of a
securities fraud.169 Thus, even though Justice Breyer was correct in his dissent, given
Justice Thomas’s suggestion that JCM could still be held potentially liable as a
secondary actor, that the Court should have remanded on this issue,170 it is likely
that a lower court would not be able to find JCM secondarily liable using Justice
Thomas’s reasoning.171 Because the Fund itself is the actor, JCM is the aider, and the
Fund does not have any agents independent of JCM, under Justice Thomas’s
holding, the actor and the aider are one in the same — they would be assisting
themselves.172 Therefore, if one cannot be primarily liable as an actor, the same
individual cannot logically be held secondarily liable as an aider or abettor.173 The
Court’s holding in Janus, for these reasons, directly created a loophole in securities
fraud litigation that, as discussed below, has and will encourage corporate
misconduct.174
Nor was Justice Thomas willing to nuance his holding to recognize an exception
for the relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser.175 This
relationship truly is, to borrow from the gatekeeper of Emerald City, “a horse of a
different color” and the law should reflect this difference.176 JCM, like most other
investment advisers to mutual funds, controlled all of the Fund’s actions; the two
entities cannot be separate from each other.177 Therefore, the loophole only gets
larger, and liability easier to avoid, with respect to mutual funds.178
2. Janus Has Stalled Much Needed Corporate Reform Because the Loophole it Creates
Has Encouraged Corporate Misconduct, and its Reasoning Fails to Recognize
Congress’s Attempted Reforms
Although Justice Thomas was attempting to avoid judicial overreach and prevent a
rise in securities fraud litigation,179 his holding has encouraged corporate

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2311 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
171. Brief for Respondent at 30, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296
(2011) (No. 09–525) (on writ of certiorari).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See infra Part IV.C.2.
175. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011) (majority opinion).
176. THE WIZARD OF OZ (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939).
177. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
178. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing the interconnectedness of mutual funds and
their investment advisers).
179. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (majority opinion).
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misconduct.180 This has caused lower federal courts in the aftermath of Janus to try
and reconcile the Court’s interpretation of Rule 10b–5 with the spirit of regulation,
and the need to hold those who commit securities fraud primarily liable in a private
right of action.181 This reading is not only bad policy, but was also a missed
opportunity to judicially complement Congressional actions such as the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.182 While Justice Thomas’s
unwillingness to act absent Congressional action, and strict adherence to the
separation of powers,183 is respectable, it was misguided.184 Congress’s failure to act is
not an example of its unwillingness to act.185 In fact, Congress — both individual
members and the institution itself — have attempted to act to address
shortcomings in securities fraud law.186 By not recognizing Congress’s attempt to
reform federal securities law, while misinterpreting Central Bank, the Court in
Janus missed an opportunity to spur corporate reform.187
The Court’s holding in Janus improperly extended Central Bank and now allows
for outsiders or secondary actors of the corporation in question, even when they are
the primary actor causing the misstatement or omission, to be protected from
liability because they do not technically have “ultimate control” over the
statements.188 This reasoning has caused numerous defendants in later cases to
utilize the loophole created in Janus, by arguing that the logic of the opinion
extends to protect corporate insiders from personal liability when they engage in
misconduct because they themselves did not “make” a statement — forcing lower
federal courts to develop a nuanced reading of Justice Thomas’s black-and-white
opinion to prevent total elimination of the concept of agency.189 Some of this
misconduct is clearly inapposite to the facts of Janus — such as in Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Das where two Chief Financial Officers attempted to claim
that Janus protected them from misstatements made in their corporation’s financial
statements — however, the fact that defendants in these cases even improperly

180. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011) (agent of a
corporation improperly relying on Janus to try to avoid liability for a misstatement issued by the corporation);
In re Merck & Co., Inc. Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation, Nos. 05–1151, 05–2367, 2011 WL 3444199, at
*24 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011) (same); see also, e.g., Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No.
3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at *4 (D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011) (discussing the confusion if Janus’s holding
extends to protecting corporate insiders without final control over issuance of a fraudulent statement).
182. Pub. L. No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
183. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011) (stating that “[a]ny
reapportionment of liability … is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts”).
184. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text.
185. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 192–202 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 130–33 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 183.

296

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Zachary K. Ostro
relied on Janus illustrate the exact shortcomings of the Court’s reasoning.190
Corporations will likely rely on Janus as a defense as they continue to engage in
misconduct.191
As opposed to a judicial decision that would have reined in corporate
misconduct, the Court’s holding in Janus essentially encourages corporations to act
improperly.192 This reality is in direct conflict with the dire need for increased
corporate responsibility in the wake of the financial crisis; holding JCM liable, or at
least avoiding the creation of a loophole in federal securities laws, would have been
a perfect judicial complement to Dodd-Frank.193 By finding JCM primarily liable,
corporate actors, fearing they too would be found liable, would have increased their
oversight and internal operations so as to comply with implicitly stronger federal
securities laws.194
Justice Thomas was unwilling to act absent direction from Congress.195 However,
Justice Thomas failed to recognize that Congress has expressly attempted to refine
and modernize federal securities laws as part of Dodd-Frank.196 A provision of
Dodd-Frank required the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study on
the effects of a potential extension of a private right of action against aiders and
abettors.197 The study was inconclusive on the issue.198 Similarly, in 2009,

190. SEC v. Das, No. 8:10CV102, 2011 WL 4375787, at *6 (D. Neb. Sept. 20, 2011); see also supra note 183
and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 165, 183 and accompanying text.
192. See Editorial, So No One’s Responsible? If Mutual Funds Want to Lie, the Supreme Court's Conservatives
Have Given Them a Way to Do It, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, at A26 (discussing how the Court’s decision makes
it “much harder for private law suits to succeed against mutual fund malefactors, even when they have admitted
to lying and cheating”); Chuck Jaffee, Supreme Court Leaves Fund Investors Hanging, WALL ST. J.
MARKETWATCH (June 19, 2011), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/supreme-court-leaves-fund-investorshanging-2011-06-19?dist=countdown (stating that if a parent company is not held liable for misstatements
made by a subsidiary, then “there’s no telling what they might think they can get away with someday”); Scott
Lemieux, The Right to Double Speak, AMERICAN PROSPECT (July 14, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/rightdouble-speak (discussing how the Court’s focus on the corporate form may have negative ramifications in the
initial public offering market, and the long-run negative consequences of initially over-valued start-up
corporations).
193. Cf. Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A
Morality Tale for Policy Makers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 312 (2005) (analyzing the historical development
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the lessons from the legislation stressing the importance of continual
reconsideration of financial legislation and regulation in light of case law development); see also Catherine
Shakespeare, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Assessing Its Impact, Charting Its Future, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 333,
355 (2008) (stating that “[Sarbanes-Oxley] has restored investor confidence in the U.S. capital markets”); see
also supra note 91.
194. See supra note 193.
195. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011).
196. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 929Z (2010)
(directing the Comptroller General of the United States to “conduct a study on the impact of authorizing a
private right of action against any person who aid or abets another person in violation of the securities laws”).
197. Id.
198. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF SECONDARY
ACTORS 45 (2011).
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Pennsylvania Democratic Senator Arlen Specter introduced S. 1551, the “Liability
for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009.”199 The act would amend
§ 20(e) to allow for private rights of actions against aiders and abettors.200 Although
the study illustrated the uncertainties of creating a private right of action against
secondary actors,201 and the bill never made it out of committee,202 both are
reflective of the need, and desire of the American public, to increase corporate
governance oversight.203 Justice Thomas not only failed to recognize Congress’s
actions, or attempted actions,204 in doing so he judicially established a new rule for
securities fraud that is completely antithetical to the directions from Congress, the
spirit of the Securities Exchange Act,205 and the economy’s current needs.206 Because
of Janus, corporate misconduct will likely increase, and the needed reform in
corporate governance is now that much more unobtainable.207
D. The Court’s Holding in Janus Reflects a Pro-Corporate Jurisprudence by the Roberts
Court to the Detriment of Investors, Consumers, and Employees
The Roberts Court’s willingness to interpret laws to promote the interests of
corporations, and shield them from liability, is not limited to Janus, or even
securities law.208 Denying First Derivative a right of action is but one example of the
current Court’s jurisprudence that is dedicated to promoting the rights and
interests of corporations, while simultaneously limiting individual investors (both
financial and political), consumers, and employees access to judicial remedy, and
their role in our economic and political processes. 209 In an array of cases —
involving such diverse issues as the proper scope of the First Amendment,210 federal
pre-emption,211 and establishment of commonality in Class Action certifications212
— the current Court has fervently promoted the rights of corporations to the

199. Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
200. Id. Congresswoman Maxine Waters introduced a complementary bill in the House of Representatives.
Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2010, H.R. 5042, 111th Cong. § 2 (2010).
201. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-664, SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY OF SECONDARY
ACTORS 45 (2011).
202. Bill Summary and Status, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551,
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN01551:@@@L&summ2=m&.
203. See supra note 193.
204. See supra note 193–200 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part IV.A.1.
206. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
208. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3.
209. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3.
210. See infra Part IV.D.1.
211. See infra Parts IV.D.2.b–c.i.
212. See infra Part IV.D.3.
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detriment of individual citizens.213 These holdings represent the Court’s consistent
inattention to needed corporate governance reform, while drastically expanding
protections for corporate entities.214 In Janus and its analogous cases, the Court has
adopted a clear-cut answer, with limited room for nuance: corporations win,
individuals lose.215 Both collectively and individually, these cases will have long-term
negative reverberations in legal, economic, and political spheres.216
1. In Janus the Court Limited the Scope of Rule 10b–5, While in Other Cases they Have
Broadened the Scope of the First Amendment — Benefiting Corporations Over
Individual Financial and Political Investors
In Citizen United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court held the Bipartisan
Campaign Finance Reform Act, which placed limits on corporate campaigns
expenditures, to violate the First Amendment.217 Per Justice Kennedy, the Court
held that a limitation on political expenditures was suppression of an entity’s
freedom of speech under the First Amendment,218 and such limitations are only
justified when they are, or have the appearance of, corruption.219 And an
independent expenditure, because it is technically unassociated with any political
campaign, cannot lead to corruption or its appearance; only a quid pro quo bribe,
according to the Court, constitutes corruption in political campaigns.220 As such, the
right of both not-for and for-profit entities to make independent political
expenditures supporting or opposing candidates for elected office is now totally
unencumbered221 — necessarily allowing a select group of individual donors and
corporate actors to spend millions of dollars and single-handedly control, or at least
influence, the outcome of political campaigns.222

213. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3.
214. See infra Parts IV.D.1–3.
215. See supra Parts IV.A–C; infra Parts IV.D.1–3.
216. See supra Parts IV.A–C; infra Parts IV.D.1–3.
217. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (“The First Amendment does not permit Congress to make these categorical
distinction based on the corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.”).
218. Id. (holding that “restrictions on corporate independent expenditures are therefore [an] invalid”
restriction on political speech).
219. Id. at 908–09. The Court reaffirmed that the Court in Buckely v. Valeo properly “sustained limits on
direct contributions in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption” because “direct
contributions” have the ability to create improper “quid pro quo corruption.” Id. at 908 (citing Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)). However, the limitations imposed on independent expenditures in the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act were too distinct to “lead to, or create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption,” and
“[t]he fact that [corporate] speakers [making independent expenditures] may have influence over or access to
elected officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt” or such expenditures do not lead to corruption.
Id. at 910 (internal citations omitted).
220. Id. at 910.
221. Id.
222. See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text.
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In Janus the Court failed to acknowledge that corporations cannot be separated
from the people that run them;223 in Citizens United it failed to acknowledge that
corporations are not people.224 Each case emphasizes the form of a dynamic, while
failing to understand the substance. By treating corporations as individual citizens,
and grating them the uninhibited right to making expenditures, the Court
completely restructured the American political process, and granted corporate
entities an even greater voice in our elections.225 Now, with the ability to freely
express a political position, and spend millions of dollars to ensure that that
position is heard, corporate actors are able to influence the outcome of an election,
as well as legislative activity.226 Just as Janus shields corporations from liability and
limits the rights of individual investors,227 Citizens United promotes the control
corporations have in our political process, while minimizing the voice of individual
citizens.228 Janus will deny financial investors a right to remedy following corporate
misconduct;229 Citizens United will effectively deny investors in our political process
the right to remedy of electing new officials, or influencing policy, because they will
necessarily be outspent by corporate entities.230 Furthermore, the Court has opened
the door to political corruption and corporate misconduct as corporations freely
spend money promoting, and candidates willingly endorse, agendas benefiting
corporations to the detriment of individuals.231
Following Citizens United, there has been widespread opposition to the Court’s
holding — both as a matter of jurisprudence, 232 and because of its consequences on
our political process.233 This opposition includes legislation on the state level to

223. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Anne Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day Prisoner’s Dilemma, 47
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2010) (discussing how the Court’s ruling in Citizens United will increase the
incentive of corporations “to participate in politics via their checkbooks” which, in turn, will increase the costs
of such political participation).
226. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 975 (2010) (“Corporations, that is, are uniquely equipped to seek laws
that favor their owners, not simply because they have a lot of money but because of their legal and
organizational structure. Remove all restrictions on their electioneering, and the door may be opened to a type
of rent seeking that is ‘far more destructive’ than what noncorporations are capable of.”).
227. See supra Parts IV.A–C.
228. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
231. See Tucker, supra note 225, at 1106 (discussing the increased corporate political participation due to
Citizens United); see also supra note 226 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Citizens United and Conservative Judicial Activism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
485, 497 (2012) (stating that the majority’s reasoning is contrary to their stated positions of judicial restraint
and originalism, and instead is a form of “selective judicial activism”) (emphasis in original).
233. See, e.g., Taking Back our Democracy: Responding to Citizens United and the Rise of Super PACs:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Judiciary Comm.,
112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of Lawrence Lessig, Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard
Law School) (discussing how the Court’s ruling in Citizens United has concentrated the political power and
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limit,234 and federal level to overturn, the Court’s holding.235 Despite this backlash,
however, the Court continues to ignore the realities of the negative implications of
its Citizens United holding, and in fact further strengthen its pro-corporate
campaign expenditure jurisprudence.236
In Arizona Free Enterprise Club v. Bennett, the Court overturned an Arizona law
that provided publicly funded candidates matching funds when they ran against
privately funded candidates to level the playing field and ensure a fair election.237
Per Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held, using parallel logic to Citizens United,
Arizona’s matching fund scheme violated the First Amendment by limiting the
ability (or desire) of citizens to make political contributions and engage in the
debate.238 In so holding, the Court strengthened Citizens United by ensuring the
power of a limited number of corporations and individuals to control elections.239
influence in the country in a minute portion of the population, and the anti-corruption opposition that has
arisen in response).
234. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
235. S.J. Res. 29, 112th Cong. (2011) (granting Congress, and the individual states, the right to regulate
campaign fundraising and spending). Four parallel pieces of legislation were introduced in the House of
Representatives — each proposing an amendment to the Constitution which would allow Congress to control
campaign finance, and limit the power of corporations to control political elections. H.R.J. Res. 6 112th Cong.
(2011) (amending the First Amendment to not extend freedom of speech protection to “any corporation,
partnership, business trust, association, or other business organization with respect to the making of
contributions, expenditures, or other disbursements of funds in connection with public elections,” and granting
Congress and the states to make laws to regulate and enforce this provision); H.R.J. Res. 7 112th Cong. (2011)
(same, but no language granting Congress or the states enforcement power); H.R.J. Res. 8 112th Cong. (2011)
(granting Congress and the states the power to limit and regulate campaign contributions); H.R.J. Res. 86 112th
Cong. (2011) (same). President Obama expressed his support of an amendment to the Constitution that would
overturn the Court’s ruling in Citizens United. Bryon Tau, Obama Calls for Constitutional Amendment to
Overturn Citizens United, POLITICO, Aug. 29, 2012, http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/08/obama-callsfor-constitutional-amendment-to-overturn-133724.html ("Over the longer term, I think we need to seriously
consider mobilizing a constitutional amendment process to overturn Citizens United (assuming the Supreme
Court doesn't revisit it). Even if the amendment process falls short, it can shine a spotlight of the super-PAC
phenomenon and help apply pressure for change.”) (internal quotations omitted).
236. See infra notes 237–243 and accompanying text.
237. 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
238. Id. at 2818 (“Once a privately financed candidate has raised or spent more than the State's initial grant
to a publicly financed candidate, each personal dollar spent by the privately financed candidate results in an
award of almost one additional dollar to his opponent. That plainly forces the privately financed candidate to
shoulder a special and potentially significant burden when choosing to exercise his First Amendment right to
spend funds on behalf of his candidacy.”) (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted).
239. See id. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“So to invalidate a statute that restricts no one's speech and
discriminates against no idea—that only provides more voices, wider discussion, and greater competition in
elections—is to undermine, rather than to enforce, the First Amendment.”). Justice Kagan, along with Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, dissented from the majority, and asserted that the Arizona law promoted free
speech by subsidizing candidates to guarantee that their voice is heard. Id. at 2812, 2835. Subsidization,
according to the dissenting justices, never limited speech because the provision merely gave others the ability to
speak, but did not limit the rights of speakers. Id. Thus, the petitioner’s argument, Justice Kagan illustrated, was
a rather novel one: their right to free speech was violated because another individual’s right to free speech was
protected. Id. This, to Justice Kagan, and the author, is what one “might call [] chutzpah.” Id. (emphasis in
original); MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 206 (10th ed. 1996) (defining “chutzpah” as Yiddish
for “supreme self-confidence,” “nerve,” or “gall”).
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Similarly, much like Justice Thomas was unwilling to develop a nuanced reading of
Rule 10b–5 in Janus,240 so too was the Court unwilling to limit its holding in Citizens
United this past summer when it summarily reversed a decision of the Montana
Supreme Court.241 Montana passed a law in the aftermath of Citizens United that
limited the ability of corporations to make political expenditures on state
campaigns given the corruption they created.242 In American Tradition Partnership,
Inc. v. Bullock, the Court, in a matter of eight sentences, invalidated Montana’s law
without even hearing the merits of the case, and held that Citizens United applied to
state elections.243 This holding, and the Court’s reluctance to nuance its
jurisprudence, reaffirms its commitment to protecting corporations to the
detriment of individuals.244 In so doing, the Court has left the American people with
only one remedy: a constitutional amendment establishing that corporations are
not individuals subject to the First Amendment.245 Because of the difficulty of
amending the Constitution, this remedy will likely prove to be impractical246 —
further creating opportunities for corporate misconduct, while denying individuals
a meaningful ability to participate in the political process.247
2. The Court’s Protection of Consumers over Individuals Has Denied Proper Consumer
Protections
Cases such as Janus and Citizens United limit the ability of individual investors to
have significant control or contribution in our financial and political systems.248
However, the Court’s jurisprudence protecting and promoting corporations is not
limited to denying the rights of investors — people who make the conscious

240. See supra Part IV.B.
241. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
242. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227(1) (2011), invalidated by Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2490 (per
curiam).
243. Am. Tradition P’ship, 132 S. Ct. at 2491 (“The question presented in this case is whether the holding of
Citizens United applies to the Montana state law. There can be no serious doubt that it does.”) (citing U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.). Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented — stating
that they ideally would grant certiorari to “reconsider Citizens United,” however, “given the Court's per curiam
disposition” they “vote[d] instead to deny the petition.” Id. at 2492.
244. See Rachael Weiner, Supreme Court’s Montana Decision Strengthens Citizens United, WASH. POST BLOG
(June 25, 2012, 10:43 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/supreme-courts-montanadecision-strengthens-citizens-united/2012/06/25/gJQA8Vln1V_blog.html (quoting Sen. Charles Schumer as
saying that the Court’s holding, “[f]or apparently political reasons[,] . . . further tipp[ed] the balance of power
in America in favor of deep-pocketed, outside [corporate] interests.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. For recent legislative action addressing this remedy, see supra note 235.
246. Amending the Constitution requires a proposal by either two-thirds of all Senators and
Representatives, or, two-thirds of all state legislatures calling for a “Convention for proposing amendments,” as
well as ratification of the proposed amendment by three-fourths of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V, § 1.
247. See supra notes 226 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Parts IV.C–D.1.
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decision to contribute.249 Instead, the Court’s pro-business holdings also limit the
rights of consumers.250 In a series of cases, the Roberts Court has: protected the
ability of wholesale distributors to control retail prices,251 allowed corporations to
impose contract terms which make consumer recovery impractical,252 shielded
generic drug companies from liability,253 and limited the ability of Congress to
regulate commercial activity to best promote socially responsible corporations.254
Each holding poses its own unique detriment to consumers, and, when viewed
collectively, are illustrative of the current Court’s pro-business jurisprudence and
its negative economic and political consequences.255
a. The Roberts Court Overturned Nearly a Century of Precedent to Make it Easier for
Corporations to Control and Maintain High Retail Prices
Manufacturers and wholesale distributors of goods necessarily have a tremendous
amount of control over distribution, and therefore, ultimate consumption of their
products.256 An historic limitation on that control, however, was the per se illegality
of vertical price controls under § 1 of the Sherman Act as established in 1911 by the
Supreme Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.257 Under Dr.
Miles, a contract between a manufacturer and retailer to set a minimum price for
the manufacturer’s product (known as “resale price maintenance” or “RPM”) was
prima facie anticompetitive, and an antitrust violation because “their sole purpose
[is] the destruction of competition and fixing of prices.”258 Despite nearly 100 years
of continued business reliance on the Court’s holding in Dr. Miles, the Supreme
Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. overturned Dr. Miles
and established a rule of reason analysis for vertical price restraints.259
By adopting a rule of reason analysis for RPM, the Roberts Court has made it
easier for large corporations to control the channels of distribution, set prices
without downstream integration, and assure themselves steadier profits by limiting
the power of discount retailers to provide consumers with quality products at

249. See infra Parts IV.D.2.a–c.
250. See infra Parts IV.D.2.a–c.
251. See infra Part IV.D.2.a.
252. See infra Part IV.D.2.b.
253. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.i.
254. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.ii.
255. See infra Parts IV.D.2.a–c.
256. See, e.g., Frederick E. Webster, Jr., Understanding the Relationships Among Brands, Consumers, and
Resellers, 28 J. OF ACAD. OF MKTG. SCI. 17, 17 (2000) (discussing the interplay between manufacturers and
resellers, and their ultimate influence over consumers and consumption of a product).
257. 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
907 (2007).
258. Id. at 408.
259. 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
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affordable prices.260 The potential benefit of preventing free riders — something
Justice Breyer recognized as limited in his dissent — does not outweigh the
practical costs of consolidating the retail markets to the select group of
manufacturer-approved retailers, and guaranteeing a higher price for consumers.261
The long-term consequences of Leegin may indeed be muted when compared to
other pro-corporate decisions because some RPM schemes may still be held to
violate the Sherman Act.262 Nevertheless, it remains yet another example of the
Modern Court’s pro-corporate jurisprudence.
Just as Janus illogically denied investors a right of action following corporate
misconduct,263 and Citizens United has granted corporations a greater voice in our
political process,264 Leegin has limited the power of the consumer.265 In Leegin the
Court held that RPM could spur competition between retailers for manufacturers’
contracts.266 However, retailers should compete for customers, not exclusive dealing
rights; being an exclusive dealer is worthless unless the retailer has customers who
can afford it.267 By granting manufacturers the ability to fix prices, and ignoring the
need to compete for customers by offering lower prices, the Court in Leegin
provided corporations greater control in the marketplace, and greater protection
from antitrust violations — necessarily increasing their ability to influence market
supply, while exposing consumers to higher prices.268 Such protection, and
enhancement, of corporate bargaining power against consumers was again
exemplified in the Court denying California the ability to protect its consumers
against unconscionable adhesion contracts in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.269

260. See id. at 929 (“[One] safe prediction[] to make about today's decision [is] that it will likely raise the
price of goods at retail.”).
261. Id. at 916 (“All this is to say that the ultimate question is not whether, but how much, ‘free riding’ of
this sort takes place. And, after reading the briefs, I must answer that question with an uncertain ‘sometimes.’”)
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted).
262. See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882 (“We now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that [the illegality
of] vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.”). In fact, since Leegin, plaintiffs have been
successful in bringing claims of unlawful RPM under the rule of reason. See, e.g., Toledo Mack Sales & Service,
Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 226 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that agreements not to compete between
Mack truck dealers had anticompetitive effects, and therefore, violated the Sherman Act).
263. See supra Part IV.A.2.
264. See supra Part IV.D.1.
265. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
266. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 890–91 (discussing how “[a]bsent vertical price restraints . . . discounting retailers
can free ride on retailers who furnish services and then capture some of the increased demand those services
generate” and the benefit of RPM to “increase interbrand competition by facilitating market entry for new firms
and brands”).
267. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Fed’n of Am. As Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5,
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480) (“In assuming that the
retail sector is a mere conduit exhibiting atomistic competition, [petitioners] overlook the robust contribution
that intertype competition has played in the development of the American economy.”).
268. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
269. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2012); see infra Part IV.D.2.b.
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b. The Court Has Protected and Promoted Highly Restrictive Consumer Contracts by
Making Small Claims Recovery Uneconomical
Given the size disparity between individual consumers and business entities,
contracts of adhesion for commercial products are inevitable; producers sell a
uniform product, and it is impractical for corporations to draft a new contract for
each customer.270 However, contracts of adhesion create an inherent risk of the
entity with significantly greater bargaining power to impose unconscionable clauses
on the customer.271 Therefore, in order to avoid blatant customer mistreatment, and
abusive contracts, it is the duty of courts to void such contracts as unenforceable.272
The California Supreme Court attempted to do this in Discover Bank v. Superior
Court when it held that class waivers in consumer arbitration agreements were
unconscionable in adhesion contracts.273 However, in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, the Supreme Court, per Justice Scalia, held the restriction to be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) because it violated a “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration.”274
In abrogating the Discover Bank rule, the Supreme Court established an
interpretation of the FAA that protects corporations from paying claims against
aggrieved customers, and, illogically, will discourage small claims arbitration.275
Many retail arbitration claims are minimal, and, without the ability to aggregate
claims in class arbitration, such consumers will likely make the decision to not
pursue the claim provided the low payout and high costs.276 By making it
uneconomical for consumers to individually arbitrate a claim, along with the high
costs and time associated with litigation, consumers are left without a practical
remedy, while corporations are free from payment.277 Furthermore, while the FAA
was written with the express purpose of promoting arbitration, it expressly voids
highly restrictive agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
270. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 25 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
271. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 557 (3d ed. 2004) (“Dangers are inherent in standardization . .
. for it affords a means by which one party may impose terms on another unwitting or even unwilling party.”).
272. See, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 2–7 (4th ed.) (2010) (“[W]hile
freedom of contract has been regarded as part of the common-law heritage so that absent an invalidating cause
such as mistake, fraud, or duress, parties who make a contract are bound to it even though the contract may be
unwise and even foolish, courts of equity have often refused to enforce some agreements when, in their sound
discretion, the agreements have been deemed unconscionable.”).
273. 113 P.3d 1100, 153 (Cal. 2005), abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753
(2012).
274. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749 (internal citations omitted). Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan dissented — stating that the Discover Bank rule did not discourage arbitration, because its purpose was
“with the scope of the [FAA]’s exception” for unconscionable contracts. Id. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
275. Id. at 1761 (stating that in cases involving small claims, a denial of class arbitration will “have the effect
of depriving claimants of their claims”) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
276. Id. (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the
possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”).
277. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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revocation of any contract.”278 By limiting the right of California to define what
constitutes unconscionable contract clauses — a matter of common law
traditionally left to the states — the Court’s holding in Concepcion denied
California the ability to protect its consumers.279 This holding will prevent states
from pursuing legislation or common law development that will ensure consumers
a right to recourse against corporations.280 Just at Janus interpreted the Securities
Exchange Act in a manner that denied investors the ability to sue anyone,281 the
holding in Concepcion makes it impractical for consumers with small claims against
retailers a right to remedy.282 As discussed below, this unjust reality of the
unprotected consumer in the retail market is most acute in the health care
industry.283
c. Recent Decisions Regarding Health Care Have Both Expressly and Implicitly
Illustrated the Court’s Pro-Corporate Jurisprudence
The health care market — a multibillion dollar-a-year industry encompassing a
variety of goods and services — requires strong regulations and access to judicial
remedy provided the severe mental and physical health consequences of
misconduct.284 However, in a pairing of recent cases involving the health care
industry, the Court has extended its pro-corporate jurisprudence by protecting
generic drug manufacturers from liability for inadequate labeling,285 and interpreted
the Commerce Clause in a manner that makes it significantly more difficult for
Congress to establish commercial markets where individuals proactively protect
themselves, and companies are required to market goods and services that allow for
adequate protections.286 These cases prevent a truly socially responsible health care
market (and in turn, the safest and healthiest possible general population), and
commercial markets generally, while providing yet another vignette of a
jurisprudence that systematically denies the opportunity to hold corporate actors
responsible for their misconduct, and ensure the safety and soundness of American
commercial activity.287

278. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
279. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760–62.
280. Id. (stating that the FAA was written with Congress’s express intention of preserving the rights of the
states to define what constitutes unconscionable contract terms, and, the Court’s holding abrogates that
principal).
281. See supra Part IV.A.
282. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
283. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.
284. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(2) (West 2012) (discussing the wide scope of the health insurance market, the
growing costs of health care, and negative economic and health consequences of improper medical care).
285. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.i.
286. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.ii.
287. See infra Parts IV.D.2.c.i–ii.
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i. The Court Has Established a Loophole in Drug Labeling Law Protecting Generic
Drug Companies from Liability
In an opinion strikingly similar to Janus, in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, the Court
denied generic drug users a remedy against manufacturers for inadequate
labeling.288 The opinion, like Janus, was written by Justice Thomas, and was decided
five-to-four with Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan dissenting.289
The plaintiffs in PLIVA were denied the opportunity to sue anyone for the physical
and medical wrong they suffered290 — much like First Derivative members were
denied the opportunity to sue anyone for the fraudulent statements in the Fund’s
prospectus.291 Like Janus, PLIVA will have the detrimental consequence of generic
drug manufacturers consciously labeling their drugs insufficiently because they
know that they are free from liability absent any action by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).292
In a consolidated opinion, the Court held that PLIVA — a generic drug
manufacturer — could not be liable for their failure to provide adequate warning
labels because their liability under state commercial tort law was pre-empted by
federal law which denies generic drug manufacturers the ability to unilaterally
change drug warning labels.293 The 1984 Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act allow generic drugs to forgo extensive studying and testing
prior to marketing, so long as the manufacturer can sufficiently illustrate
“sameness” to the brand name drug that must be pre-approved by the FDA.294 As
such, a generic drug must have the same label as the brand name, and the
manufacturer must convince the FDA and the brand name drug to adopt different
288. 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011).
289. Id. at 2572, 2582. Justice Kennedy joined the majority opinion in all but Part III.B.2. of the opinion.
Id. at 2571. In this section of the opinion, Justice Thomas asserted that the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution is a non obstante clause — a parliamentary mechanism used to “impliedly repeal conflicting []
law.” Id. at 2579–80. As such, it was not necessary, according to the plurality of the Court, for a party facing
conflicting state and federal laws to proactively find ways to reconcile conflicting state and federal law duties. Id.
at 2580.
290. Id. at 2581 (“Had Mensing and Demahy taken Reglan, the brand-name drug prescribed by their
doctors . . . their lawsuits would not be pre-empted[,] [b]ut because [their] pharmacists, acting in full accord
with state law, substituted generic metoclopramide instead, federal law preempts these lawsuits.”); see also id. at
2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“As a result of today's decision, whether a consumer harmed by inadequate
warnings can obtain relief turns solely on the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription
with a brand-name or generic drug. The Court gets one thing right: This outcome ‘makes little sense.’”)
(internal cross-reference omitted).
291. See supra Part IV.A.
292. See infra notes 297–301 and accompanying text.
293. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (“Here, state law imposed a duty on the Manufacturers to take a certain
action, and federal law barred them from taking that action. The only action the Manufacturers could
independently take – asking for the FDA's help – is not a matter of state-law concern. Mensing and Demahy's
tort claims are pre-empted.”).
294. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (stating that a generic drug manufacturer must provide “information to
show that the new drug is bioequivalent to the [brand name] drug”).
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language to their label in order to maintain labeling equivalence.295 However, the
Court held that the state law duty did not require the generic manufacturer to
petition the FDA for a new warning requirement — making PLIVA not liable even
though they knew their warning labels were inadequate.296
Due to the Court’s interpretation of federal pre-emption, which allowed PLIVA
to remain idle, the plaintiffs were denied the ability to sue any entity because federal
law pre-empted PLIVA’s liability, and there was no cause of action against the
brand name manufacturer because their pharmacist did not fill the prescription
with the brand name drug, even thought that is what their doctor prescribed297 — a
very common practice (occurring nearly 90% of the time when a generic drug is
available) that is encouraged by both states and the federal government as a means
providing consumers access to affordable medication.298 This creates an illogical
situation (which Justice Thomas even recognized as absurd): consumers of
prescription medication with inadequate labeling are at the mercy of their
pharmacist, and generic drug manufacturers — a $66 billion a year industry in the
United States — are free from liability for inadequate liability because they cannot
unilaterally change their labels, and have no duty to change them absent action
from the FDA or the brand name manufacturer.299 In PLIVA, like in Janus, the
Court knowingly interpreted federal law in a manner that expressly denies
individuals remedy against corporate wrongdoing.300 By shielding generic drug
manufacturers from liability, the Court missed an opportunity to provide
individuals adequate remedy, and ensure socially responsible drug labeling.301 This
protection of generic drug manufactures was complimented this summer by a
rejection of Congressional commercial regulatory power — again denying
necessary consumer protection and corporate regulations.302
ii. The Court’s Restrictive Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Denies Congress the Ability
to Create Pragmatic Consumer Protection Laws
Superficially, the Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent Businesses
v. Sebelius, in which it largely upheld President Obama’s signature Affordable Care
295. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (holding that the respondents “[could not] satisfy [their] state duties
without the Federal Government's special permission and assistance”).
296. Id. at 2581.
297. Id. at 2582.
298. Id. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION
FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 27 (1998),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf).
299. Id. at 2583–84 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
300. Id.; see Part IV.A.
301. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that “[a]s a result [of the decision],
in many cases, consumers will have no ability to persevere their state–law right to recover for injuries caused by
inadequate warnings[,]” which, in turn, “could have troubling consequences for drug safety”).
302. See infra Part IV.D.2.c.ii.
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Act (ACA), is representative of a change in the Court’s jurisprudence denying
consumer protections against corporations (e.g., insurance companies limiting or
denying coverage to certain individuals).303 However, the nature of the decision
makes the case a pyrrhic victory for individuals, and will likely leave corporations
— both generally, and in the health care market specifically — unharmed.304 In
upholding the individual mandate’s penalty for failure to purchase health insurance
as a tax, and not a valid regulation of commerce, the Court maintained the practical
integrity of the ACA because all individuals will be required to purchase insurance
or pay a penalty.305 In so doing, however, the majority of the Court asserted an
interpretation of the Commerce Clause306 that is highly restrictive.307 The language
used in the Chief Justice’s opinion, as well as the joint dissenters’ opinion, rejecting
the individual mandate to be a valid regulation of commerce unequivocally rejects
the notion of broad federal power to regulate commercial (in)activity, and reasserts
the Court’s jurisprudence rejecting broad (and liberal) interpretations of federal
laws to regulation corporations.308

303. See 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (“The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain individual’s pay
a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax. Because the
Constitution permits such a tax, it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness.”).
304. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
305. See infra note 312.
306. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have [p]ower [t]o . . . regulate [c]ommerce with
foreign [n]ations, and among the several [s]tates, and with the Indian tribes.”).
307. Nat’l. Fed. of Ind. Bus. 132 S. Ct. at 2587, 2589, 2591 (stating that “[t]he individual mandate . . .
compels individuals to become active in commerce by purchasing a product” and “[a]ccepting [this
interpretation of the Commerce Clause] would give Congress the same license to regulate what we do not do”
would be unacceptable because “[t]he Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual from
cradle to grave. . . .”) (emphasis in original); see also id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ.,
dissenting) (“If Congress can reach out and command even those furthest from participation in the market,
then the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited power, or in Hamilton’s words, ‘the hideous monster
whose devouring jaws . . . spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane.” (citing THE
FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 202 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)))); id. (“[T]he Commerce clause, even
when supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, is not carte blanche for doing whatever will help
achieve the ends Congress seeks by the regulation of commerce.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 2648 (“[I]f every
person comes within the Commerce Clause power of Congress to regulate [their activity] by the simple reason
that he will one day engage in commerce, the idea of a limited Government power is at an end.”); id. at 2677
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I adhere to my view that the very notion of a substantial effects test under the
Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of Congress’ powers and with this Court’s
early Commerce Clause cases. As I have explained, the Court’s continued use of that test has encouraged the
Federal Government to persist in its view that the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits. The Government’s
unprecedented claim in this suit that it may regulate not only economic activity but also inactivity that
substantially affects interstate commerce is a case in point.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations
omitted) (internal citations omitted). But see id. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (finding that a proper reader
of the Commerce Clause does grant Congress the power to require individual to purchase health insurance, and
the majority’s objection is based on the legislation’s “novelty” but “[a]s our national economy grows and
changes, [the Court] ha[s] recognized, Congress must adapt to the changing economic and financial realities. . .
. [I]f history is any guide, today’s construction of the Commerce Clause will not endure”).
308. See supra note 307.
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This highly restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause will likely make it harder
for Congress to pass legislation designed to protect consumers and ensure socially
responsible corporations.309 As the ACA requires individuals to purchase health
insurance, it is theoretically plausible that Congress would require businesses to
purchase virus software to protect their servers from hackers and ensure the safety
of shareholders’ assets, or pay a substantial penalty. Or, similarly, to ensure the
safety of American children, Congress could require individuals claiming
dependents on their annual tax return to provide proof that if they purchased a
vehicle, it is one that is safe for children, or pay a penalty. Yet, following NFIB,
despite how logical these laws would be, they would only be upheld, if at all, as a
310
tax. Therefore, such laws would have to be written with that clear intent —
making it significantly harder to pass Congress given the general aversion to taxes.311
Without requiring companies purchase virus software, many would likely forgo the
purchase as a cost saving measure; and without requiring that parents purchase
child-safe cars, auto manufacturers would be less inclined to produce such costly
vehicles — leaving consumers unprotected, and corporations unregulated.
Furthermore, the Court’s narrow Commerce Clause jurisprudence may even
inspire future litigation on existing laws and regulations.312 Just as the Court’s
restrictive reading of the Commerce Clause in NFIB will have the detrimental
consequence of denying Congress of the ability to pass legislation designed to
protect consumers,313 so too did it in Walmart v. Dukes,314 take a narrow reading of
class certification requirements — unnecessarily denying minority individuals class
action remedy following workplace discrimination.315
3. The Court’s Restrictive Reading of Class Action Certification Provides Employers a
Roadmap for Avoiding Employee Class Action Litigation
In 2007 in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Supreme Court denied Lilly
Ledbetter a right of action for pay discrimination because her claim was filed more

309. See infra notes 312 and accompanying text.
310. See Nat’l Fed. of Ind. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2600 (“The Affordable Care Act’s requirement that certain
individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasonably be characterized as a
tax.”).
311. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, America’s Aversion to Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2012, at B1 (discussing the
role the issue of taxes play in our political campaigns and legislation, and the public’s general aversion to
incurring higher tax liability).
312. See Adam Liptak, Justices, By 5-4, Uphold Health Care Law; Roberts In Majority; Victory For Obama,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A1(quoting Yale Law School Professor Akhil Amar as stating that a “dark cloud”
of the Court’s Commerce Clause language is that “[f]ederal power has more restrictions on it . . . [g]oing
forward, [causing] there [to] even be laws on the books that have to be re-examined” in light of the Court’s
holding) (internal quotations omitted).
313. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
314. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
315. See infra Part IV.D.3.
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than 180 days after the initial violation, and therefore past the statute of
limitations.316 Recognizing this inadequacy, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2009, which established that an unlawful discriminatory compensation is
made every time an employee is paid — thereby restarting the 180-day statute of
limitations every pay period.317 This new law is a logical amendment to promote
non-discriminatory pay, while protecting the rights of women and minorities to
remedy following unfair treatment by their employers.318 Despite this recent change
in the law, and the underlying recognition that gender-based pay discrimination is a
reality, the Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes denied a class action certification
of over two million female Wal-Mart employees scattered across the country for
lacking commonality of claims per Rule 23(a)(2) because discriminatory hiring
decisions were made at each store, and not through the corporate headquarters —
thereby making their claims too disparate for a class action.319
This high pleading standard unnecessarily imposes restrictive class certification
standards,320 and, furthermore, disregards recent changes in the law following
Ledbetter to make it easier for employees to bring discrimination claims against
their employer. However, most importantly, in holding that Wal-Mart’s decentralized decision making disallowed for the proposed class to meet the
commonality requirement, the Court provided large corporations with a roadmap
to avoid class action liability: give regional managers or distributors greater control
in the hiring process.321 Much like the Court’s reasoning in Janus gave companies a
step-by-step guide of avoiding securities fraud liability,322 in Dukes the Court gave
corporations explicit guidelines for protecting a company from class actions.
Following Dukes, decentralized decision-making process in a corporate enterprise
all but guarantees the inability of disparately located employees to satisfy Rule
23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.323 Janus has and will encourage corporate
misconduct to the detriment of investors,324 so too will Dukes encourage

316. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 550 U.S. 618, 621 (2007).
317. Pub. L. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
318. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. E159, E170 (2009) (statement of Rep. Charles Rangle) (“The passage and
enactment of this act will restore prior longstanding law which will enable women and others to challenge
instances of pay discrimination within 180 days of a discriminatory pay check. For too long women have
performed the same tasks and have been unequally compensated. Unequal pay is not merely a women's issue
but a disparity that affects all of us.”).
319. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556–57 (2011); FED. R. CIV. PRO. R. 23(a)(2) (“One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representatives of all members only if . . . there are questions of law or fact common to the
class.”).
320. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2566 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 2556 (majority opinion) (holding the decentralized decision making process made it impossible
for the plaintiffs to have a common complaint for class certification).
322. See supra Part IV.C.
323. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2556 (holding the decentralized decision making process made it impossible for
the plaintiffs to have a common complaint for class certification).
324. See supra Part IV.C.
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corporations to adopt management structures designed to avoid litigation, instead
of actively pursuing policies to promote fair and equal treatment of employees325 —
making it yet another illustration of the Roberts Court’s holistic jurisprudence that
continuously promotes the interests of corporations over investors, consumers, and
employees, and misses opportunities to promote socially responsible corporate
governance.326

V. Conclusion
The Court’s holding in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders327 was a
three-part failure.328 It misinterpreted, and vastly expanded, the protection of
secondary actors in Central Bank to extend to primary violators.329 It missed an
opportunity to judicially create an exception for the investment adviser scenario.330
And lastly, by focusing on the corporate form, it created a loophole for securities
fraud violators to avoid liability.331 In the guise of judicial restraint, the Court
inappropriately further protected corporations and corporate actors from liability,
and missed an opportunity to judicially complement recent legislative attempts to
reform financial markets, and promote socially responsible corporations.332
Furthermore, the Court’s failure in Janus is an illustrative microcosm of a
jurisprudence that consistently and emphatically protects corporations to the injury
of individuals333 — creating a zero sum game between private litigants and
corporate defendants. An equilibrium must be reached, however, where
corporations are free from oppressive regulations, while still held accountable for
their actions, and not impervious to the law. Recent decisions by the Roberts Court
fail to recognize this need, and will prevent socially responsible corporate
governance, while encouraging and protecting corporate mistreatment of investors,
consumers, and employees.334
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326.
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329.
330.
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332.
333.
334.
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See supra notes 321–23 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts IV.A–D.2, note 323 and accompanying text.
131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
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